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BANKRUPTCY-A DEBTOR UNDER REORGANIZATION PURSUANT TO
CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE CANNOT DESIGNATE THE
ALLOCATION OF ITS PRIORITY TAX LIABILITIES
In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc. (1987)
Under the laws of the United States, all employers are required to
withhold from their employees' gross wages a scheduled amount repre-
senting the employees' social security and income tax obligations.'
These withheld sums are commonly referred to as "trust fund taxes" 2
and are credited to the employee regardless of whether the employer
pays them to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 3 Unfortunately, it fre-
quently occurs in bankruptcy cases that the debtor fails to pay the with-
held funds to the IRS prior to petitioning for bankruptcy. 4 The debtor's
employees are unaffected by this misappropriation as they are automati-
cally credited for their tax payment when funds are withheld from their
pay. 5 On the other hand, the debtor/employer's problems are just
1. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3102(a) (1982) (Federal Insurance Contribution
Act (F.I.C.A.) taxes); id. §§ 3402(a), 3403 (income taxes); id. § 7501 (detailing
employers' legal duty to withhold employees' F.I.C.A. and income taxes and
hold same in trust for United States); Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238,
242-43 (1978); 33 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Taxation § 598 (1988) (F.I.C.A. taxes); id.
§ 3698 (income taxes).
2. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978). "Trust fund" taxes
are those taxes withheld from employees' paychecks which include the employ-
ees' share of social security taxes (F.I.C.A.) and income taxes. Other employer
tax liabilities, such as the employer's share of income taxes and social security
taxes, are generally denominated as "non-trust fund" taxes. In re Avildsen
Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d 1248, 1249 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986); Holcomb v.
United States, 622 F.2d 937, 938 n.3 (7th Cir. 1980). The withheld trust fund
taxes are required to be held in special trust for the United States, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7501 (1982).
3. For a discussion of the impact upon the employee resulting from the
employer's failure to pay the trust fund taxes, see infra note 5 and accompanying
text.
4. In many situations, a financially plagued employer sees the trust fund
taxes as a tempting source of ready cash, and rather than pay the IRS, the em-
ployer misappropriates the funds to meet day-to-day expenses incurred in oper-
ating his or her business. See, e.g., Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243
(1978) (taxes withheld weekly or bimonthly and payable to IRS quarterly be-
come temporary source of ready cash); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268,
277-78 n.10 (1978) (observing that tven "honest" businessman may misappro-
priate trust funds to salvage troubled business). See generally 2 COWENS, BANK-
RUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 615 (1987).
5. An employee who is subject to withholding taxes is credited by the gov-
ernment for the amount of F.I.C.A. and income taxes withheld from his pay,
regardless of whether the funds are actually paid from the employer to the IRS.
Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978); In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828
F.2d 199, 200 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d
1248, 1251 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d
(556)
1
Silpe: Bankruptcy - A Debtor under Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
beginning.
Although the employer who fails to pay trust fund taxes is liable
under sections 3102(b) and 3403 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.),
Congress has provided the government with an additional civil remedy
under section 6672 of the I.R.C. 6 Section 6672 permits the government
to seek recovery against the individuals personally responsible for the
collection of trust fund taxes in an amount equal to the unremitted trust
fund debt. 7 Section 6672 thus enhances the government's ability to re-
cover trust fund taxes by providing an additional source of collection for
the government. Section 6672, however, does not allow for double re-
covery as the tax may only be collected through one of the available
remedial devices. 8
The government's recovery of an employer's delinquent trust fund
taxes may be deferred when the employer files for reorganization 9
1546, 1548 (lth Cir. 1986); Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 744 (5th
Cir. 1970). Congress enacted section 6672 of the I.R.C. to provide a remedy to
protect the government from suffering such loss. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200.
For a discussion of section 6672, see infra note 7 and accompanying text.
6. See 26 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (1982) (employers liable for employees' portion
of F.I.C.A. taxes required to be deducted and withheld); id., §§ 3102(a), 3403
(employers liable for employees' portion of income taxes required to be de-
ducted and withheld); id. § 6672 (holding persons responsible for collection of
trust fund taxes personally liable for amount collected but not paid to IRS).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1982). Section 6672(a) provides in relevant part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any
tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truth-
fully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any
manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not ac-
counted for and paid over.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 6671 (b) defines "person" for purposes of section
6672 as including "an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or
employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee or member is under a
duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs." Id. § 6671(b).
Although the statutory liability imposed by section 6672 is essentially civil in
nature, section 7202, which substantively parallels the language of section 6672,
makes a violator guilty of a felony subject to a fine of $10,000 and imprisonment
for five years. Id. § 7202; see also Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 245
(1978) (section 6672 limited to willful conduct).
8. See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 n.12 (1978) (quoting
Comptroller General, Opinion B-137762 (May 3, 1977), reprinted in 9 1977
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) $ 6614 at 71,438 (May 3, 1977)); cf. Datlof v.
United States, 370 F.2d 655, 656 (3d Cir. 1966) (IRS need not attempt to collect
from employer before imposing section 6672), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
9. The filing of a reorganization petition has the legal effect of halting all
judicial action against a debtor, including actions brought for the assessment of
federal tax liabilities. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The filing
stays
the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or pro-
ceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
19881
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under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.' 0 Because any
unpaid prebankruptcy petition trust fund taxes may be recovered
against individual officers or employees who are responsible for their
collection, debtors under a proposed bankruptcy reorganization plan
generally request that all tax payments made to the government be first
applied to reduce the trust fund portion of their federal tax liability." I
before the commencement of the case. . ., or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case....
Id. The debtor thus enjoys the protection of an injunction barring secured and
unsecured creditors from seeking payment without court intervention. See, e.g.,
In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1987). Section 1123 governs the
content of the reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
See Technical Knockout Graphics, 833 F.2d at 803 (proposed plan must be "fair and
equitable" and satisfy the payment priorities of the Bankruptcy Code) (citing In
re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984)).
A Chapter 11 reorganization is available to "persons", a term defined by the
Code to include individuals, partnerships and corporations. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101(30), 109(d) (1982). The primary purpose of Chapter 11 is to rehabilitate
businesses so that they can continue to operate, maintain employment levels,
pay creditors and ascertain a return for their investors or shareholders. A. Co-
HEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR MAT-
TERS 265 (1981). See generally B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW
MANUAL, 8.01 (1986) (reorganization is better than liquidation from viewpoint
of employees, shareholders and creditors).
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A filing in bank-
ruptcy is brought pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C.§§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (all business rehabilitation governed by
Chapter 11). The implementation of a reorganization plan under Chapter 11,
which provides the debtor the opportunity to be rehabilitated and emerge as a
functioning unit in the economy, has been characterized as the "fresh start" doc-
trine. In re Alison Corp., 9 Bankr. 827, 829 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). In the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress expressed a
preference for reorganization over liquidation:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to
operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce
a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization
is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they
were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap.... If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be
returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorgan-
ize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6179.
11. The employer's debt will generally consist of trust fund and nontrust
fund taxes. See Holcomb v. United States, 622 F.2d 937, 938-39 (7th Cir. 1980)
(taxpayer's promise to pay tax assessment was not sufficient consideration to
support contract to allocate payments initially against trust fund debt). By pay-
ing off the trust fund taxes, the responsible person would be relieved of personal
liability under section 6672 for these trust fund taxes. See Ducharmes & Co. v.
Michigan, 75 Bankr. 71, 72-73 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
Although it is customary to permit a Chapter 11 debtor to pay off its delin-
quent trust fund taxes pursuant to the reorganization plan, the IRS has an ex-
press right to use the section 6672(a) remedy to collect the unpaid taxes
[Vol. 33: p. 556
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In effect, by allocating payments made under a Chapter 11 plan first to
the trust fund tax delinquency, the employer reduces the risk of per-
sonal liability of responsible persons under section 6672. However, this
method of tax allocation may have an adverse impact upon the govern-
ment in the event that the debtor fails to fulfill the plan's obligation to
pay the taxes in full. 12 To illustrate, if the debtor satisfies his trust fund
obligation prior to satisfying his entire tax debt, the government has no
personal cause of action against the debtor's officers in the event of the
debtor's default. '3
The question of whether a debtor under a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion can designate the allocation of its tax payments rests upon whether
the payments are characterized as voluntary or involuntary. 14 When a
taxpayer makes a voluntary' 5 payment of taxes, the IRS will allow the
immediately rather than waiting for payment pursuant to the plan. See Datlof v.
United States, 370 F.2d 655, 656 (3d Cir. 1966) (IRS need not pursue collection
from employer prior to assessing responsible person under section 6672), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967). IRS policy states:
The 100-percent penalty.., will be used only as a collection device....
[T]he 100-percent penalty may be asserted . . .whenever such taxes
cannot be immediately collected from the corporation itself.... The
withheld income and employment taxes or collected excise taxes will be
collected only once, whether from the corporation, from one or more
of its responsible persons, or from the corporation and one or more of
its responsible persons.
Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN. L. REV.
1279, 1280 n.7 (1986) (quoting IRS Policy Statement P-5-60, 1 Internal Reve-
nue Manual-Administration (CCH) 1305-15 (May 30, 1984)). Cf In re Tentex
Marine, Inc., 83 Bankr. 530 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988) (office of Chapter 11
debtor from whom IRS collected 100-percent penalty could not be subrogated
to priority position of IRS).
12. See Ducharmes & Co. v. Michigan, 75 Bankr. 71, 72-73 (E.D. Mich.
1987). If a confirmed reorganization plan provides that a debtor's tax payments
are applied first to the trust fund portion of its tax liability and the debtor fails to
pay his tax liability in full, the government's ability to recover trust fund taxes
from the "responsible persons" will be impaired since any payments made
would reduce the amount for which the "responsible persons" are liable. Id. It
is, therefore, the policy of the IRS to apply tax payments first to nontrust fund
debts whenever possible. See IRS Policy Statement P-5-60, 1 Internal Revenue
Manual-Administration 1305-15 (May 30, 1984). For a further discussion of this
IRS policy, see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
13. See Ducharmes & Co. v. Michigan, 75 Bankr. 71, 72-73 (E.D. Mich.
1987). For a discussion of the potential impact on the government if the
debtor's tax payments are applied first against the trust fund debt, see supra note
12 and accompanying text.
14. In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1987).
15. The voluntariness of a tax payment made pursuant to a Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization is an issue of controversy. Currently, there is a clear
split between the jurisdictions on whether a debtor's tax payment pursuant to a
Chapter 11 reorganization is voluntary for purposes of determining the debtor's
right to have its tax payment applied first to its trust fund liability. The defini-
tion of involuntary payment most often used is stated as follows: "An involun-
tary payment of Federal taxes means any payment received by agents of the
United States as a result of distraint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which
1988] 559
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taxpayer to designate the tax liability to which the tax payment will be
applied.16 However, when a tax payment is made involuntarily or with-
out directions for its application, it is IRS policy to apply the payment
first to nontrust fund taxes due. 17 Currently, there is a jurisdictional
split on the question of whether tax payments made pursuant to a bank-
ruptcy plan are voluntary.' 8 Recently, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit concluded that payments on prepetition
the Government is seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim there-
for." Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65, 69 (1966). For a further discussion of
this split of authority, see infra notes 18-21, 59-89 and accompanying text.
16. See Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83 (modifying Rev. Rul. 73-305,
1973-2 C.B. 43) (superseding Rev. Rul. 58-239, 1958-1 C.B. 94); see, e.g., In re
Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1987), Wood v. United States, 808
F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d
1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1986); Muntwyler v. United States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1032
(7th Cir. 1983) (citing O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir.
1964)).
17. IRS Policy Statement P-5-60, 1 Internal Revenue Manual-
Administration 1305-15 (May 30, 1984) (IRS may allocate involuntary payment
to whatever liability it chooses); see, e.g., Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238,
252 n.15 (1978); In re Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1987); In re A & B
Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462, 463 (1 1th Cir. 1987); In re Avildsen
Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1986); Muntwyler v.
United States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1983). Tax payments applied first
to a debtor's trust fund tax liability reduce pro tanto the amount for which re-
sponsible persons are liable under section 6672. Ducharmes & Co. v. Michigan,
75 Bankr. 71, 72-73 (E.D. Mich. 1987). Thus, in the event of a debtor's default,
the tax liability left unpaid is more likely to be nontrust fund taxes for which
responsible persons are not liable. The government's only recourse to recover
nontrust fund taxes is against the bankrupt debtor. Conversely, if the debtor's
tax payments are first applied to its nontrust fund debt and the debtor defaults,
the unpaid taxes will consist of trust fund taxes for which the government can
seek recovery against responsible persons under section 6672. The IRS, there-
fore, prefers to apply a debtor's payments first to the nontrust fund portion of
the debt. See generally Lore & Goldfein, Effective Tax Procedures: Penalties Eliminated
by Specific Payment Allocation, 59J. TAx'N 120, 121 (Aug. 1983).
18. For examples of decisions holding that payments made pursuant to
Chapter 11 are voluntary, see Ducharmes & Co. v. Michigan, 75 Bankr. 71 (E.D.
Mich. 1987); Tom Le Duc Enter. v. United States, 47 Bankr. 900 (W.D. Mo.
1984); In re Professional Technical Services, Inc., 80 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987); In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); In
re Franklin Press, Inc., 52 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Lifescape,
Inc., 54 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); In re Hartley Plumbing Co., 32
Bankr. 8 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1983). For examples of decisions holding that pay-
ments made pursuant to Chapter 11 are involuntary, see In re Technical Knock-
out Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc.,828 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Herald, 66 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1986); In re
Avildsen Tools & Machines, Inc., 40 Bankr. 253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); aff'd on
other grounds, 794 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Mister Marvins, Inc., 48 Bankr.
279 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
For other cases holding tax payments made under bankruptcy proceedings
to be involuntary, see In re Frost, 47 Bankr. 961 (D. Kan. 1985) (Chapter 13); In
re Tam Specialty Co., 57 Bankr. 37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1985); In re Office Dynam-
ics, Inc., 39 Bankr. 760 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (Chapter 7); In re Obie Elie
Wrecking Co., 35 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (Chapter 11 converted
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federal tax liabilities by a debtor, pursuant to a plan of reorganization
under Chapter 11, are "most realistically classified as involuntary" for
the purposes of designating how the tax payments should be allo-
cated.' 9 Thus, in In re Ribs-R-Us20 the Third Circuit held that a debtor
under reorganization pursuant to Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code
cannot direct the allocation of federal tax payments between the trust
fund and nontrust fund portions of its tax liabilities.
2
'
On July 29, 1985, Ribs-R-Us, Inc. (hereinafter Ribs) 2 2 filed a volun-
tary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New
Jersey.2 3 Immediately thereafter, the bankruptcy court appointed Ribs a
debtor-in-possession which permitted Ribs to operate its business dur-
ing the reorganization. 24 At the time of the bankruptcy petition, Ribs
into Chapter 7). See generally Lore & Garbis, Is Bankruptcy Claim Payment Volun-
tary?, 65J. TAX'N 280 (Oct. 1986); Lore & Goldfein, supra note 17, at 121.
For examples of decisions applying a case by case analysis in determining
whether tax payments are voluntary, see In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning,
823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987) (remanded to bankruptcy court for determina-
tion); Hineline v. Household Fin. Corp., 72 Bankr. 642 (N.D. Ohio 1987), on
remand, 72 Bankr. 645 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (based on various factors, payments
made pursuant to Chapter 11 plan held involuntary); In re B & P Enter., 67
Bankr. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986) (payments held involuntary).
19. In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1987).
20. 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 204. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning for disal-
lowing the debtor to allocate its tax payments initially to its trust fund debt, see
infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
22. Ribs, prior to filing of its bankruptcy petition, operated a restaurant in
Verona, New Jersey. Id. at 199.
23. Id. The filing of a petition for reorganization commences bankruptcy
proceeding and vests the debtor's property in the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). All legal and equitable interests of the debtor
prior to its petition for bankruptcy are property of the estate. Id. § 541(a)(1). In
addition, property of the estate includes "any interest in property that the estate
acquires after the commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(7).
24. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 199-200. A debtor becomes a debtor-in-posses-
sion absent the appointment and qualification of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1101
(1982). Ribs remained at all times a debtor-in-possession pursuant to section
1107(a), no trustee having been appointed. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 199-200.
Section 1107(a) provides in relevant part: "[A] debtor in possession shall have
all the rights, other than the right to compensation.., and powers, and shall
perform all the functions and duties ... of a trustee serving in a case under this
chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Since a trustee is normally not appointed in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor is
considered a debtor-in-possession and is provided with the rights and powers
generally entrusted to a trustee. Id. The debtor-in-possession, however, is not
free to deal with the estate's property as it chooses because he is deemed to hold
it in trust for the benefit of creditors. Id. In addition, the debtor-in-possession
is required to inform creditors and obtain the court's permission for any pay-
ment other than one in the ordinary course of business. Id. § 363(b), (c); In re
Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing In
re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (5th Cir. 1986)). Seegener-
ally B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 9, at $ 8.10-11.
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was delinquent in its payment of corporate income taxes as well as trust
fund taxes. 2 5 The government, in order to protect its claim against
Ribs, filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for the delinquent
taxes.26
Ribs' proposed bankruptcy reorganization plan provided for the re-
payment of priority claims 2 7 to be funded by the proceeds from the sub-
lease of a Ribs restaurant and the sale of its liquor license.2 8 The plan
further provided that priority tax claims,2 9 including federal tax claims,
be paid over a period not to exceed six years after the date of assessment
of such claims. 30 The dispute before the court, however, arose out of a
25. Appellee's Brief at 6, In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987)
(No. 86-6774).
26. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200. The filing of the bankruptcy petition en-
joined both secured and unsecured creditors from pursuing claims against Ribs
without the intervention of the court. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). In a reorganization under Chapter 11, secured and unsecured claim-
ants receive payment through a plan of rehabilitation. Id. §§ 1121-1129. Since
a voluntary petition for reorganization operates as a stay of pending and future
litigation under section 362(a), creditors, including the IRS, must file a claim for
back taxes in the bankruptcy court in order to participate in the distribution of
assets. Id. § 362.
27. In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress established a comprehen-
sive scheme which created priority levels for payments made to certain classes of
general creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Trust fund taxes
owed to the government receive seventh priority under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding. Id. § 507(a)(7)(C). For a discussion of the derivation of the priority
of trust fund taxes, see H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANK-
RUPTCY REFORM ACT 224-25 (1986). For further discussion of the priority of
trust fund taxes, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
28. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200. Ribs' reorganization plan divided Ribs'
creditors and shareholders into seven classes consisting of different secured and
unsecured parties. Appellee's Brief at 4, Ribs-R-Us (No. 86-5774). The plan
granted general unsecured creditors 25 percent of their claims in cash from
funds contributed by Mitchell Meckles and Mitchell Levy, Ribs' principal share-
holders, officers and directors. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200. The plan committed
Meckles and Levy to pay this debt from their personal assets in exchange for 100
percent of the stock in the reorganized Ribs. Id. at 200.
29. Section 507(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code provides unsecured govern-
ment claims seventh priority in bankruptcy cases to the extent the claims are for
"(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts... [or] (C) a tax required
to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in whatever capac-
ity .... 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
F.I.C.A. and employee withholding taxes (trust fund taxes) are given seventh
priority under section 507(a)(7)(C). "The phrase 'in whatever capacity' operates
to include the liability of a responsible officer under the Internal Revenue Code
(section 6672) for income taxes or for the employee's share of social security
taxes which that officer was responsible for withholding from the wages of em-
ployees and paying to the Treasury, although he was not himself the employer."
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 507.04 at 507-42 (15th ed. 1987).
30. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200. Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code con-
tains the standards governing confirmation of a Chapter I plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Specifically, section 1129(a)(9)(C) provides:
[W]ith respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(7) of this
title, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim de-
562
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provision in the plan which stated " '[a]ll payments to any member of
this class shall first be applied, or shall be deemed applied, to reduce the
"trust fund" portion of the creditor's claim, if any.' 31
The government objected to the confirmation of this reorganization
plan contending, inter alia, that tax payments pursuant to Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings were involuntary, thus permitting the govern-
ment to allocate the payments initially to the nontrust fund portion
due.3 2 The bankruptcy court denied the government's objection on the
ground that Ribs' payments of priority tax claims under the plan were
voluntary and ordered the government to allocate the payments as des-
ignated under the plan. 3" The case was subsequently affirmed on ap-
peal to the district court but reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.3 4
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Ribs-R-Us by citing the
United States Tax Court's definition of an involuntary tax payment. 3 5
In Amos v. Commissioner,36 the Tax Court formulated the most frequently
quoted definition of an involuntary payment of federal taxes as being
"any payment received by agents of the United States as a result of dis-
traint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which the Government is
seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim therefor. ' ' 37 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted this
definition in Muntwyler v. United States,38 and held that absent any court
or administrative involvement resulting in seizure of property or money,
there is no basis to hold that tax payments are involuntary.3 9 In Ribs-R-
ferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years after the
date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim.
Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
In Ribs-R-Us, the plan provided that the trust fund taxes were to be paid in
full at an interest rate of 10% in equal monthly installments over the six year
maximum period. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200 & n.1.
31. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200 (quoting Appendix to Briefs at 71, Ribs-R-Us
(No. 86-5774)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 201. For a discussion of this definition and its effect upon a tax
payment of prepetition tax liabilities pursuant to a Chapter 11 reorganization,
see infra notes 36-41, 61-78 and accompanying text.
36. 47 T.C. 65 (1966).
37. Id. at 69. For a list of cases that follow the Amos definition of involun-
tary payment, see infra note 61.
38. 703 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983).
39. Id. at 1033. In Muntwyler, a corporation which was delinquent in paying
its federal withholding taxes entered into a common law assignment to a trustee
for the benefit of its creditors. Id. at 1031. When the trustee sent payments to
the IRS, the IRS refused to apply the payments to the trust fund portion of the
corporate tax liability as requested by the trustee. Id. at 1031-32. The Muntwyler
court, in determining that the trustee's payment to the IRS was voluntary,
concluded:
1988] 563
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Us, the Third Circuit relied upon the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
the Amos definition in holding that payments of prepetition taxes pursu-
ant to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 are involuntary.40
However, the Third Circuit recognized that the facts of Muntwyler were
distinguishable from those in Ribs-R-Us on the basis that the tax pay-
ments in Muntwyler were not being distributed pursuant to the judicial
supervision of a bankruptcy court.41
The distinction between a voluntary and involuntary payment in Amos
and all the other cases is not made on the basis of the presence of ad-
ministrative action alone, but rather the presence of court action or ad-
ministrative action resulting in an actual seizure of property or money as
in a levy. No authorities support the proposition that a payment is in-
voluntary whenever an agency takes even the slightest action to collect
taxes, such as filing a claim or, as appears to be a logical extension of
the Government's position, telephoning or writing the taxpayer to in-
form him of taxes due.
Id. at 1033 (emphasis in original).
40. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 201-03. Using the Amos definition of "involun-
tary payment," the Seventh Circuit held that the mere filing of a claim by the IRS
for back taxes in a nonjudicial proceeding did not convert a subsequent tax pay-
ment into an involuntary payment for the purpose of determining the allocation
to the trust fund portion of taxes owed to the government. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d
at 1033. However the Muntwyler court stated in dicta that "[tihe government
might have been correct in its claim if the corporation had been in bankruptcy,
which it was not." Id. at 1034 n.2. See In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 794
F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1986). In Avildsen, the district court had held that tax pay-
ments made by a corporation during the time it was reorganizing under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Act was not voluntary and thus the corporation had no
right to direct the application of its payment to the liability of its choice. In re
Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 40 Bankr. 253, 256-57 (D.C. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 794 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1986).
However, the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court's decision,
never reached the issue addressed by the district court. 794 F.2d at 1252. In-
stead, the Seventh Circuit held that the government was correct in allocating the
corporation's tax payments since the corporation breached an alleged agree-
ment to settle the delinquent prebankruptcy petition taxes. Id.; cf In re Tom Le
Duc Enter., 47 Bankr. 900 (Bankr. D. Mo. 1984) (absent agreement as to how tax
payment is to be applied, IRS may apply payment received against any amount
owed). But see In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462, 465 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (allocation of taxes in Chapter 11 reorganization should be left to
judicial discretion of bankruptcy court) (citing In re B & P Enter., 67 Bankr. 179
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986)). Nevertheless, in his concurring opinion in Avildsen,
Judge Ripple indicated that he would have upheld the district court's conclusion
that a debtor's tax payments during a Chapter 11 reorganization were involun-
tary. 794 F.2d at 1254 (Ripple, J., concurring).
41. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 201. In Ribs-R-Us, the debtor filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 200. The
debtor was under express judicial order of the bankruptcy court and was subject
to various statutory constraints which curtailed and limited its discretionary ac-
tion. Id. at 202-03. However, in Muntwyler, the company was not under judicial
order. The IRS did not levy upon the property in possession of the trustee, but
rather filed a claim with the trustee for the taxes due. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at
1031. For a further discussion of the statutory constraints placed upon a Chap-
ter 11 debtor, see infra notes 49, 64-66 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit next examined In re A & B Heating & Air Condition-
ing,4 2 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit considered the same voluntary/involuntary issue facing the court in
Ribs-R-Us.4 3 The Eleventh Circuit, in applying a more discretionary ap-
proach to the determination of voluntariness, rejected the IRS' position
that ". . . all payments made under a Chapter 11 reorganization are in-
voluntary and thus properly allocated by the IRS." '4 4 Instead, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the allocation of taxes in a Chapter II
reorganization should be left to "the judicial discretion of the bank-
ruptcy court to be decided on a case by case basis."'4 5 The Ribs-R-Us
court sharply disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's discretionary ap-
42. 823 F.2d 462 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
43. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 202. InA &B Heating &Air Conditioning, the IRS
levied upon the assets of A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. for the remit-
tance of withheld trust fund taxes. 823 F.2d at 463. A & B Heating promptly
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and
proposed a bankruptcy plan permitting the allocation of tax payments to be ap-
plied first to its trust fund debt. Id. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan
overruling the government's objection. Id. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently
held that the allocation should be left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court
upon consideration of the bankruptcy plan as a whole and remanded to the dis-
trict court. Id. at 466.
44. 823 F.2d at 465-66. The court in A & B Heating & Air Conditioning recog-
nized the bankruptcy court's conclusion that:
[c]ourt involvement in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization case
is not the type which results in seizure of property or money as in a levy
.... [A] Chapter 11 debtor enjoys great latitude in how and if a plan is
proposed and thus how and when the IRS will be paid.... The debtor
propounding a plan has a number of options with respect to treatment
of a claim by the IRS and it is the freedom afforded by these options
which dictates the conclusion that payments to the IRS pursuant to a
confirmed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization are voluntary.
Id. at 464 (quoting In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 53 Bankr. 54, 57
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985), remanded, 823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987)); see also In re
Lifescape, Inc., 54 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (voluntariness established
by latitude provided in section 1129).
45. A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 465 (citing In re B & P
Enter., 67 Bankr. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986)). The court in A & B
Heating &Air Conditioning held that the bankruptcy court should look at a number
of factors in considering the "equitable reasons warranting such allocations,"
such as:
the history of the debtor, the absence or existence of prebankruptcy
collection or 'enforced collection measures' of the IRS against the cor-
poration and responsible corporate officers; the nature and contents of
a Chapter 11 plan (e.g., last resort liquidation or reorganization); the
presence, extent and nature of administrative and/or court action; the
presence of pre-or post-bankruptcy agreements between the debtor (or
trustee) and the I.R.S.; and the existence of exceptional or special cir-
cumstances or equitable reasons warranting such allocation.
Id. at 466 (quoting In re B & P Enter., 67 Bankr. 179, 184 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986)). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court should
consider the intent of the debtor and "whether the proposed plan is merely a
stop gap scheme to hold the taxing authority at bay with little chance that the
debtor will fulfill its obligation under the plan." Id. at 466.
1988] 565
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proach and held that "[a] uniform federal rule is preferable so that debt-
ors, creditors and the [IRS] will be able to know in advance whether the
debtor can make such a designation and guide their decisions
accordingly." 46
The Ribs-R-Us court further reasoned that in determining whether
the debtor's tax payments are voluntary, the court need only consider
the payment of taxes by a Chapter 11 debtor as opposed to the payment
of taxes in any judicial proceeding. 47 Under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a debtor who obtains a stay of pending and future litiga-
tion under section 362(a) is free of all claims not filed in bankruptcy
court.4 8 In exchange for these benefits, the debtor becomes subject to
numerous statutory requirements. 4 9 In light of these statutory require-
ments, the Third Circuit reasoned that it would be "inconsistent with
the realities of bankruptcy" to interpret payments under a Chapter 11
reorganization as voluntary. 50 Moreover, the court recognized that fol-
lowing the confirmation of a reorganization plan, the debtor is subject to
the express judicial order of the bankruptcy court, thereby distinguish-
ing prepetition from postconfirmation payments. 51 Thus, the Third Cir-
46. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 202. The Third Circuit further held that the de-
termination of whether payment of prepetition back taxes are voluntary is a
"question of law" rather than an issue left to judicial discretion. Id. (citing Pearl-
man v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946) (applied uniform federal rule
in tax cases)).
47. Id. In response to arguments by the parties over the extent to which tax
payments are involuntary, the court concluded that it:
need not decide whether any payment in the context of a judicial pro-
ceeding would be considered involuntary [but rather] ... we limit our
consideration to whether a payment of taxes by a Chapter 11 debtor
can be considered voluntary in light of the restrictions imposed upon
the debtor by the statutory scheme.
Id. (emphasis added). The debtor unsuccessfully argued that only payments re-
sulting from "enforced collection measures," such as filing liens or seizing assets
which lead to an actual seizure of property, should be considered involuntary.
Id. The government, in contrast, argued that "a payment is involuntary when-
ever it is made in the context of court proceedings." Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 26 U.S.C. § 6213(0)(2)
(1982). For further discussion of debtor's rights under a stay of proceedings,
see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
49. Section 541 provides that a debtor's property becomes part of the bank-
ruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Although the debtor
in Ribs-R-Us was a debtor-in-possession and was free to operate and dispose of
property in the ordinary course of business, Ribs' actions were subject to the
fiduciary duties of a trustee entrusted with dealing with the property of the es-
tate for the benefit of the creditors. Id. §§ 1107(a), 363(c)(1); see also Wolf v.
Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1963). Moreover, the debtor is bound by the
reorganization plan and is subject to orders that a bankruptcy court deems nec-
essary to carry out the reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1142(b). For a
further discussion of the rights and duties of a debtor-in-possession, see supra
note 24.
50. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203.
51. Id. Confirmation of a reorganization plan under Chapter 11 discharges
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders and general partners in
566
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cuit concurred with the dissenting opinion of Judge Sidney C. Volinn of
the bankruptcy appellate panel in In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc. ,52
which unequivocably stated that the statutory constraints placed upon a
Chapter 11 debtor changed the characterization of a tax payment to that
of an involuntary payment.
53
The debtor in Ribs-R-Us argued that the leniency of section
1129(a)(9)(C) 54 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides the debtor six
years to pay its taxes, subordinates the policy of procuring revenue, as
set forth under section 6672 of the I.R.C., to the competing policy of
promoting successful Chapter 11 reorganizations. 55 The Third Circuit
the debtor except to the extent that they are included in the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). However, trust fund taxes, which are the
seventh priority allowed to unsecured claims to governmental units under sec-
tion 507(a)(7), are not dischargeable under Chapter 11. Id. § 523(a)(1)(A).
Ribs unsuccessfully argued that its obligation to pay priority tax claims
under a plan of reorganization was no greater than its obligation to pay prepeti-
tion taxes and thus could not be the basis for finding the payments involuntary.
Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203.
52. 68 Bankr. 463 (9th Cir. 1986) (Volinn, Bankr. J., dissenting), rev'd, 833
F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 471 (Volinn, Bankr. J., dissenting). Judge Volinn's dissenting
opinion was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit when that court reversed the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision
on November 30, 1987. See In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d
797, 803 (9th Cir. 1987) (because filing Chapter 11 petition keeps creditors at
bay during reorganization, IRS may apply debtor's payments as it sees fit).
Judge Volinn, in his dissenting opinion, recognized that a Chapter 11 debtor, as
a fiduciary, is not free to serve its own interests but rather is required to act for
the benefit of its creditors when dealing with its own assets which have become
vested in the estate. Technical Knockout Graphics, 68 Bankr. at 470. Moreover, the
statutory constraints imposed under the Bankruptcy Code curtail and limit dis-
cretionary action on the debtor's part and subject the debtor to any order that
the bankruptcy court deems necessary to carry out the reorganization. Id.; see 11
U.S.C. § 1142(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Third Circuit agreed with Judge
Volinn's characterization of the type of entity that files for bankruptcy:
Debtors who file under any chapter of the bankruptcy code have few, if
any, options. As a practical matter, they file bankruptcy because it is a
last chance for a relatively ordered financial liquidation or rehabilita-
tion rather than the out-of-control financial debacle facing them on the
eve of bankruptcy.
Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203 (quoting Technical Knockout Graphics, 68 Bankr. at 469
(Volinn, Banidr. J., dissenting)) (emphasis in original).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a review of
section 1129, see supra note 30.
55. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203 (citing Appellee's Brief at 13, Ribs-R-Us (No.
86-5774)). The debtor unsuccessfully argued that its tax payments should be
classified as voluntary because
the Debtor could have proposed a single lump sum payment of all of
the Government's taxes (plus interest) on the last day of the sixth year
following confirmation, and subject to the court's determination of the
feasibility of such payment the Government would have been powerless
to oppose such a payment plan.
Id. at 203 n.3 (quoting Appellee's Brief at 28, Ribs-R-Us (No. 86-5774)). The
Third Circuit rejected this argument in holding that the mere fact that a debtor
12
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rejected this argument on the basis of a lack of legislative history under-
lying the Bankruptcy Code suggesting that Congress intended to curtail
the "IRS' longstanding ability to use 26 U.S.C. § 6672 to provide a col-
lateral source for collection of trust fund taxes." '5 6 Moreover, the Third
Circuit recognized that in the event of a debtor's default, the Bankruptcy
Code does not grant either a debtor or a bankruptcy court the authority
to direct the allocation of tax payments which would impair the govern-
ment's ability to recover trust fund taxes. 5 7 Lastly, the Ribs-R-Us court
refuted the debtor's assertion that the success of the reorganization is
dependent upon the allocation of tax payments. 58
The determination of voluntariness of tax payments pursuant to a
Chapter 11 reorganization is a controversial issue and has created a
point of disagreement between courts. 59 The Third Circuit in its recent
decision in Ribs-R-Us disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's and several
bankruptcy courts' approach to the characterization of prebankruptcy
petition tax payments under a Chapter 11 reorganization. 60 Oddly
has the option of choosing when to make the payment within the six year period
does not render the payment "voluntary." Id.
56. Id. at 203.
57. Id. at 203-04. The Ninth Circuit in Technical Knockout Graphics, in revers-
ing the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision which interpreted section
505(a)(1) to authorize the allocation of tax payments, held that section 505(a)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the allocation of tax payments made
to the IRS, but rather simply permits the bankruptcy court to determine the
amount of the tax liability. Technical Knockout Graphics, 833 F.2d at 803. Section
505(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
[T]he court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine
or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previ-
ously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested
before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of com-
petent jurisdiction.
11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Moreover, the court in that case recognized that a bankruptcy court's
"broad equitable powers may only be exercised in a manner which is consistent
with the provisions of the Code." Technical Knockout Graphics, 833 F.2d at 803
(quoting Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984)). The Third Circuit similarly rejected the bank-
ruptcy appellate panel's interpretation of section 505(a)(1) in holding that that
section does not implicitly allow for the direct allocation of tax payments, espe-
cially where to do so would contravene federal policy underlying a tax code pro-
vision. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 204 n.4; cf. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co.,
783 F.2d 1546 (11 th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
IRS assessment under section 6672); Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210
(7th Cir.) (disregarded bankruptcy court's allocation order so as to preserve IRS
trust fund claim against corporate officer), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
58. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 204. The Third Circuit held that its decision to
designate a Chapter 11 debtor's tax payments as involuntary was as a "matter of
law" and did not depend upon the success of the reorganization. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the impact a denial of the debtor's tax allocation might have on the
success of a reorganization plan, see infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of the split in the courts, see supra note 18.
60. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 201-02.
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enough, courts uniformly accept the Amos definition of an "involuntary
payment" and its application in Muntwyler.6 ' The difficulty arises in the
manner in which courts interpret the langauge used by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Muntwyler. The Seventh Circuit characterized an involuntary pay-
ment as being associated with "the presence of court action or
administrative action resulting in an actual seizure of property or money
as in a levy."'6 2 Under this interpretation, the determination of volunta-
riness hinges upon whether a confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization con-
stitutes sufficient judicial action to make the payment pursuant to the
reorganization plan involuntary. 63
The Third Circuit, in applying the Muntwyler interpretation to a
Chapter 1 1 case, correctly held that the statutory constraints imposed
on a debtor under a Chapter 11 reorganization changes the character of
a tax payment to involuntary. 64 The Third Circuit relied on the dissent-
ing opinion ofJudge Volinn in Technical Knockout Graphics which similarly
construed the statutory constraints of a Chapter 11 reorganization. 6 5
61. See, e.g., Technical Knockout Graphics, 833 F.2d at 802 (tax payments made
after filing bankruptcy petition but prior to confirmation of reorganization plan
are involuntary); Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 201 (payments of pre-petition tax liabili-
ties made pursuant to Chapter 11 reorganization are involuntary); In re A & B
Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462, 463 (11 th Cir. 1987) (voluntariness
of tax payments by Chapter 11 debtor left to discretion of bankruptcy court);
Duchamres & Co. v. Michigan, 75 Bankr. 71, 73 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (payment of
taxes pursuant to confirmed plan of reorganization are voluntary); In re Mister
Marvins, Inc., 48 Bankr. 279, 281 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (tax payments by Chapter
11 debtor are involuntary); In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702, 704-05
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (tax payments pursuant to Chapter 11 reorganization are
voluntary); In re Lifescape, Inc., 54 Bankr. 526, 527-28 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985)
(same).
62. Muntwyler v. United States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1983) (em-
phasis in original).
63. For examples of differing judicial resolutions of this single definition,
see Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d 199 (Chapter 11 reorganization deemed sufficient judi-
cial action to make tax payments involuntary); In re Lifescape, Inc., 54 Bankr.
526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (tax payments made pursuant to Chapter 11 reor-
ganization are voluntary). For a further discussion of the characterization of a
tax payment made pursuant to a Chapter 11 reorganization, see supra notes 14-
21 and accompanying text.
64. See Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203. The Third Circuit in Ribs-R-Us recog-
nized that a Chapter 11 debtor is subject to the control of the court, which in its
view was found to constitute sufficient judicial intervention to satisfy the Amos
definition of involuntariness. Id. at 202-03. Specifically, the bankruptcy court
has the authority to determine the petitioner's tax obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 505
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). These tax payments, which are priority claims under
section 507(a)(7), must be paid in full within six years of the IRS claim. Id.
§ 1129(a)(9)(C). The debtor's property vests in the bankruptcy estate which the
debtor is not free to use for its own interests. Id. § 541 (a). Moreover, the bank-
ruptcy court may issue any other orders to the debtor as it deems necessary to
carry out the reorganization. Id. §§ 105(a), 1142(b); Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203;
In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 40 Bankr. 253, 256 (N.D. 11. 1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 794 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203. For a discussion ofJudge Volinn's statutory
14
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Technical Knockout Graphics concurred with the Third Circuit's reasoning
in Ribs-R-Us and reversed the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision.6 6
The Ninth Circuit, in agreement with the Third Circuit in Ribs-R-Us,
construed the constraints placed upon a Chapter 11 debtor by sections
541(a) and 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code as constituting sufficient judi-
cial action under the Amos definition of involuntariness. 6 7 Similarly, in
In re Mister Marvins,6 8 the district court, in interpreting the language of
Muntwyler, held that tax payments pursuant to a Chapter 11 proceeding
were not voluntary, thereby supporting the IRS's allocation of a debtor's
tax payments. 6 9
Despite this line of cases, several district and bankruptcy courts
have maintained that court involvement under a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion does not constitute sufficient judicial involvement to support the
involuntary characterization. 70 For example, in In re Lifescape, Inc. ,71 the
interpretation of the constraints placed upon a Chapter 11 debtor, see supra note
53 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797, 802-03 (9th Cir.
1987). The Ninth Circuit stated:
[B]y filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11, TKO used the au-
thority of the court to keep its creditors at bay while it reorganized and
regained financial stability. TKO is not free to abuse this system by
designating its payments in a way that benefits only its responsible per-
sons, and possibly harms other creditors, including the IRS, without
the scrutiny of the court or other creditors. The IRS is [thus] entitled
to apply TKO's payments as the IRS sees fit, to preserve the right of the
IRS to pursue the responsible persons under 26 U.S.C. § 6672.
Id. at 803.
67. For a discussion of the constraints placed upon a Chapter 11 debtor by
sections 54 1(a) and 1107, see supra notes 23-24.
68. 48 Bankr. 279 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
69. Id. at 281. The district court in Mister Marvins maintained that the dis-
tinction between a voluntary and involuntary payment is not based upon the
type of enforcement proceeding but rather "on the basis of the existence or
non-existence of some form of court action." Id. (citing Muntwyler v. United
States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1983)). The court thus concluded that
the distribution of property from the debtor's estate in payment of taxes to the
government in accordance with the priorities set forth under section 507(a)(7) of
the Bankruptcy Code cannot be considered voluntary. Id.
70. See, e.g., Ducharmes & Co. v. Michigan, 75 Bankr. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(Chapter 11 debtor permitted to allocate tax payments); In re Professional Tech-
nical Services, Inc., 80 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987) (payment of pre-peti-
tion taxes in liquidating Chapter 11 constitutes voluntary payment); In re Energy
Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (Chapter 11 proceeding
doesn't render payment involuntary); In re Lifescape, Inc., 54 Bankr. 526 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1985) (mere filing of claim by IRS doesn't constitute sufficient judicial
action for involuntariness); In re Franklin Press, Inc., 52 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. D.
Fla. 1985) (reorganization funded by infusion with third party establishes volun-
tariness); accord In re Hartley Plumbing Co., 32 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1983)
(payments made by Chapter 11 debtor pursuant to section 1129 deemed
voluntary).
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bankruptcy court concluded that "voluntariness is established by the lat-
itude enjoyed by the debtor in how and when the IRS will be paid within
the purview of section 1129."72 The Lifescape court, similar to the Elev-
enth Circuit in A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, emphasized the consid-
erable flexibility of section 1129(a)(9)(C) in that it merely sets
parameters within which the debtor's plan must fit.
73
Although many district and bankruptcy courts which hold payments
to be voluntary rely on the language of the Seventh Circuit in
Muntwyler-that the payments made to the IRS were voluntary because
"there was no levy, judicial order, execution, or judicial sale; rather,
there was a mere filing of a claim"-this language must be interpreted in
light of the fact that there was no formal bankruptcy proceeding in the
Muntwyler case.7 4 Thus, the facts of Muntwyler are distinguishable from
those of Ribs-R-Us and other Chapter 11 cases where judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated.7 5 The Seventh Circuit in Muntwyler recognized
this distinction when it stated in dicta that it did "not equate the assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors with a formal bankruptcy proceed-
ing."' 76 Moreover, the Muntwyler court also stated in dicta that "It]he
71. 54 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
72. Id. at 529. Section 1129(a)(9)(C) stipulates that a debtor must pay off
trust fund taxes owed to the government within a period of six years after the
date the claim was assessed. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
For further discussion of section 1129 and the facts of Ribs-R-Us, see supra note
30 and accompanying text.
73. Lifescape, 54 Bankr. at 528-29. The bankruptcy court in Lifescape held
that tax payments made under a plan of reorganization pursuant to section
1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code are voluntary. since the restrictions im-
posed do not create the kind of legal action necessary to render a payment invol-
untary. Id. at 529. Specifically, the court stated that the "filing of a claim in a
Chapter 11 proceeding ... does not approach the actual seizure of money or
property" envisioned in Amos and Muntwyler. Id. at 529; accord In re Energy Re-
sources Co., 59 Bankr. 702, 705 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (Chapter 11 proceeding
does not render tax payments involuntary). For a discussion of In re A & B Heat-
ing & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1987), see supra notes 42-45
and accompanying text.
74. Muntwyler v. United States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1983). In
Muntwyler, the delinquent corporate taxpayer was not under the jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court because it had not yet filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 1031. In-
stead the corporation created a common-law, nonjudicial trust and assigned all
of its assets to a trustee for the benefit of its creditors. Id.
75. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits as well as the Third Circuit in Ribs-R-
Us have reasoned that the Seventh Circuit in Muntwyler characterized the taxpay-
ers' payments as voluntary because it distinguished the creation of a common-
law, nonjudicial trust for the benefit of its creditors from payments made in
bankruptcy, court action involving only the latter. Technical Knockout Graphics,
833 F.2d at 802 (9th Cir. 1987); Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 201;A & B Heating &Air
Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 464. For a further discussion of this distinction, see
infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
76. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1034 n.2. The Seventh Circuit recognized that
"[a]n assignment for the benefit of creditors is an act of bankruptcy [as opposed to
an act under a formal bankruptcy proceeding] and presumably any creditor, in-
cluding the Government, could have proceeded to file an involuntary petition
19881
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss3/4
572 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33: p. 556
government might have been correct in its claim [that the payments
were involuntary] if the corporation had been in bankruptcy."'7 7 The
Muntwyler case, therefore, does not adequately support the position that
a debtor's payment of taxes pursuant to a Chapter II proceeding is
voluntary. 78
In A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, the Eleventh Circuit submitted
that the split in authority with regard to the issue of voluntariness of
prebankruptcy petition tax payments is a direct result of the conflicting
policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and the I.R.C. 79 In that case,
the Eleventh Circuit weighed the public policy considerations of the two
statutory schemes, and determined that it would be detrimental to a re-
organization plan to permit the IRS to allocate tax payments in all Chap-
ter 11 proceedings.8 0 The Eleventh Circuit maintained that personal
for bankruptcy based thereon, but no creditor, including the Government, did
so." Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Judge Ripple in his concurrence in In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc.,
held that the language in Muntwyler was not controlling in regard to tax pay-
ments distributed pursuant to the judicial supervision of a bankruptcy court. In
re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple,
J., concurring). Moreover, Judge Ripple would have held that the district court
correctly concluded that tax payments to the IRS during a Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation were involuntary. Id. Similarly, the district court in interpreting
Muntwyler stated that "the Seventh Circuit made it abundantly clear that it was
the involvement of a court-not the type of bankruptcy-which makes payments
by a debtor in bankruptcy involuntary." Avildsen v. United States, 40 Bankr.
253, 256 (N.D. Il1. 1984) (citing Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1033), aff'd on other
grounds, 794 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1986)). The district court held that the nature
of the bankruptcy, be it a reorganization or liquidation, does not affect the invol-
untary nature of the tax payments since the IRS is precluded from collecting its
taxes other than by filing a claim in a judicial proceeding. Id.; accord In re Mister
Marvins, 48 Bankr. 279 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that Muntwyler supports gov-
ernment's case).
79. A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 464. Although both the
I.R.C. and the Bankruptcy Code are Congressional enactments, they facilitate
different federal policies, namely revenue collection and the rehabilitation of
bankrupt parties respectively. Id. at 465. Congress addressed these conflicting
goals:
In a broad sense, the goals of rehabilitating debtors and giving equal
treatment to private voluntary creditors must be balanced with the in-
terests of governmental tax authorities who, if unpaid taxes exist, are
creditors in the proceeding .... A three-way tension thus exists among
(1) general creditors, who should not have the funds available for pay-
ment of debts exhausted by an excessive accumulation of taxes for past
years; (2) the debtor, whose "fresh start" should likewise not be bur-
dened with such an accumulation; and (3) the tax collector, who should
not lose taxes which he has not had reasonable time to collect or which
the law has restrained him from collecting.
Id. at 464 n.3 (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5799-5800).
80. Id. at 465. The Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning set forth in a
Minnesota Law Review Note which stated:
If corporate officers are pressured to pay the taxes out of their own
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liability of the responsible persons under section 6672 would adversely
affect the corporate debtor's efforts to reorganize and thus defeat the
rehabilitative purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. 8 l The court further
held that absent an "express congressional statement" that the policy
underlying the I.R.C. takes priority over that of the Bankruptcy Code in
determining the allocation of tax payments, tax payments made by a
Chapter 11 debtor may be characterized as voluntary.8 2 The Third Cir-
cuit in Ribs-R-Us was not persuaded by this reasoning since it rejected
the contention that Ribs' proposed reorganization plan was contingent
upon the bankruptcy court's approval of the trust fund designation.8 3
In any event, the Third Circuit decided Ribs-R-Us as a "legal matter"
and limited its holding to whether tax payments by a Chapter 11 debtor
can be considered voluntary in light of the statutory restrictions im-
posed upon the debtor.8 4 Moreover, the Third Circuit concluded that
such a designation by a Chapter 11 debtor would detract from Con-
gress' strong policy of ensuring tax revenues to the government.8 5
Ironically, it was the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Huckabee Auto
Co. 8 6 which held that a challenge to section 6672 liability was outside the
pockets, the incentive to continue successful reorganization is reduced,
and it becomes more likely that the responsible officers will convert to
Chapter 7 liquidation. Under Chapter 7, as in Chapter 11, taxes have
priority; the government will be paid in full whether sufficient funds
remain for other unsecured creditors or not. The responsible officers
are guaranteed that no tax penalty will be assessed against them
personally.
Id. (quoting Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70
MINN. L. REV. 1279, 1299-1300 (1986)).
81. Id. at 465. The court reasoned that the responsible persons are usually
the ones directing the reorganization plan and it is their efforts which control
the reorganized company's future viability. Id. For a further discussion of what
constitutes a responsible person, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
82. Id. The court thus determined that the allocation question should be
left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court upon consideration of the bank-
ruptcy plan as a whole. Id. at 465 n.4; see also In re B & P Enter., 67 Bankr. 179,
183-84 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986) (debtor must demonstrate "exceptional or
special circumstances" justifying the allocation). The Eleventh Circuit's discre-
tionary approach to allocation rests upon the subjective determination of
whether a debtor deserves the opportunity to allocate its tax payments. For a
discussion of the factors noted by the court in A & B Heating & Air Conditioning,
see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
83. In re Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d 199, 202, 204 (3d Cir. 1987). The Third Cir-
cuit reasoned that the Ribs' officers in structuring the reorganization had no
assurance that the court would permit the Chapter 11 debtor to designate its tax
payments and therefore could not have relied upon a favorable tax designation
as a basis for seeking reorganization. Id. at 204.
84. Id. at 202.
85. Id. at 204. See In re Tentex Marine, Inc., 83 Bankr. 530, 535 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1988) (absent recourse to officers, initial allocation of Chapter 11
debtor's tax payments to trust fund debt would have impared IRS's collection).
86. 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
19881
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scope of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.8 7 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit explicitly concluded that "[i]t is therefore irrelevant that the [tax]
penalty, if assessed, will adversely affect the corporate debtor's reorgani-
zation."8 8 Although there may be some correlation between section
6672 and the debtor's motivation to reorganize, the Eleventh Circuit in
A & B Heating & Air Conditioning failed to consider that the policy under-
lying the Bankruptcy Code is to benefit the debtor's estate and enhance
the debtor's ability to be rehabilitated, not reduce the responsible per-
sons' financial liability under section 6672.89 Thus, the Third Circuit
was justified in not following the reasoning set forth in A & B Heating &
Air Conditioning.
In summation, the determination of whether a debtor under reor-
ganization pursuant to Chapter 11 can designate that its tax payments
be applied first to satisfy its trust fund liability was an issue of first im-
pression for the Third Circuit in Ribs-R-Us. The resolution of this ques-
tion clearly rested upon whether a Chapter 11 debtor's tax payments are
characterized as voluntary or involuntary. Although the Third Circuit's
classification of pre-petition priority tax liabilities as involuntary has
been adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Technical Knockout Graphics, there
87. Id. at 1548. The Eleventh Circuit in Huckabee held that the jurisdiction
of a bankruptcy court under a Chapter 11 proceeding encompasses the determi-
nation of the debtor's tax liability but does not extend to section 6672 liability of
taxpayers who are not debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1549. The
court reasoned that section 6672 liability is separate and distinct from the liabil-
ity of the Chapter 11 debtor and therefore outside the scope of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction regardless of its impact upon the reorganization. Id. at 1547-
49.
88. Id. at 1549.
89. See In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462, 465 (11 th
Cir. 1987). The federal policy underlying the I.R.C., specifically section 6672, is
to ensure the collection and remittance of employee withholding taxes to the
government. See In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797, 803
(9th Cir. 1987) (Chapter 11 debtor not permitted to designate payments in way
that benefits only its responsible persons); In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199,
203 (3d Cir. 1987) (purpose of section 6672 is to provide collateral source of
collection of trust fund taxes); In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d
1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1986) (policy of applying involuntary payments initially
against nontrust fund taxes is consistent with purpose underlying I.R.C.); New-
some v. United States, 431 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970) (denied corporate officer's
claim for recovery of partial payment of section 6672 penalty). On the other
hand, the federal policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code is to provide bankrupts
a reasonable opportunity to rehabilitate for their own financial benefit as well as
for the benefit of their creditors and employees. See A & B Heating & Air Condi-
tioning, 823 F.2d at 465 (permitting IRS to allocate tax payments runs contrary to
policy of Bankruptcy Code); In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702, 706(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (same). For a further discussion of the policy underlying
a Chapter 11 reorganization, see supra note 10. It must be recognized that it is
the purpose of neither the I.R.C. nor the Bankruptcy Code to protect a "respon-
sible person" who has deliberately misappropriated trust fund taxes withheld
from an employee's pay.
574 [Vol. 33: p. 556
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still exists a split among the circuits.9 0 It is apparent that the different
approaches taken by the Third and Ninth Circuits on the one hand and
the Eleventh Circuit on the other stem from these courts' differing inter-
pretations of the conflicting policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code
and the I.R.C.9 '
The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the statutory con-
straints imposed upon a party filing a bankruptcy petition pursuant to
Chapter 11 restrict the rights of the debtor, thereby causing its tax pay-
ments to fit within the Amos definition of an involuntary payment.
9 2
Moreover, these circuits have held that it would be in derogation of
Congress' intention in enacting the Bankruptcy Code and the I.R.C.,
specifically section 6672, to permit a debtor to designate its payments in
such a way that benefits only its responsible persons. 93 On the other
hand, it is the position of the Eleventh Circuit that absent an "express
congressional statement that the Internal Revenue Code is to take prior-
ity over the Bankruptcy Code" a Chapter 11 debtor's payments may be
voluntary. 9 4 It is submitted that attempts to resolve this issue will con-
tinue to result in controversy among the jurisdictions until Congress
clarifies whether a priority claim pursuant to a Chapter 11 proceeding
was intended to be an enforced collection measure as opposed to a mere
obligation to remit taxes due.
Richard Silpe
90. For a discussion of this division, see supra note 18.
91. For a discussion of these approaches, see supra notes 79-89 and accom-
panying text.
92. For a discussion of the restrictions imposed upon a debtor pursuant to
a Chapter 11 reorganization, see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. For
a contrary interpretation of these statutory restrictions by several district and
bankruptcy courts, see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
93. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 204; Technical Knockout Graphics, 833 F.2d at 803.
94. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 465. For a discus-
sion of the Eleventh Circuit's position on the policy considerations regarding
the allocation of tax payments of a debtor whose officers are subject to section
6672 liability, see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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